Constitutional Status of Solitary Confinement by Cole, Kenneth M., III
Cornell Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 3 February 1972 Article 7
Constitutional Status of Solitary Confinement
Kenneth M. Cole III
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth M. Cole III, Constitutional Status of Solitary Confinement, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 476 (1972)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol57/iss3/7
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT
Although the Supreme Court recognized the dangers 9 f solitary
confinement1 eighty years ago,2 it is still a common means of prison
discipline in almost all jurisdictions. 3 Moreover, it has often been up-
held as a proper method of enforcing prison rules and discipline4
and of administrative control of inmates considered to be a threat to
themselves, to others, or to the safety and security of the institution.5
Because of this mantle of precedent, only a few courts have challenged
I As used throughout this note, the term "solitary confinement" covers those forms
of in-prison punishment that totally remove a prisoner from inmate society. Whatever
other term is used-isolation, punitive segregation, confinement to a strip cell or the
"hole"--the essential feature of solitary confinement is isolation from other prisoners and
sometimes guards, and often a complete removal from sensory and physical stimuli.
2 Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). This case by no means rejected solitary
punishment per se. It only held that a statute imposing the punishment of solitary con-
finement was an ex post facto law. However, the Court did recognize the adverse effects
of solitary upon prisoners:
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into
a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them,
and others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide; while those
who stood the ordeal better. . . did not recover sufficient mental activity to be
of any subsequent service to the community.
Id. at 168.
3 See S. RUBIN, H. WEIHOFEN, G. EDWARDs & S. ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF CmmiNAL
CoIMcrON 293 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN]. See also Teeters, A Limited Survey
of Some Prison Practices and Policies, 14 PRISON WORLD 5 (May-June 1952).
4 The Federal Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, has
broad authority to provide for the discipline of federal inmates. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001,
4042 (1970). Broad discretion is also given to most state prison officials by statute. E.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. Rv. § 18-81 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-239 (1956); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 124, § 1 (1965); N.Y. CoRRac. LAw § 46 (McKinney Supp. 1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5145.03 (Anderson 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 350 (1964). See Jacob, Prison Disci.
pline and Inmate Rights, 5 HRav. Civ. RIoHrs-CIv. LIB. L. Rav. 227, 227 n.1 (1970).
5 Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425 (1905); Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905);
Trezza v. Brush, 142 U.S. 160 (1891); McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); Courtney
v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969); Ford v. Board of Managers, 407 F.2d 937 (3d
Cir. 1969); Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967); Landman v. Peyton,
370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965).
Since solitary confinement is authorized by statute in about half of the states and
is used in almost every prison (RUBIN 293), some abuse is almost unavoidable. Approxi-
mately 24% of all prison disciplinary actions consist of solitary confinement. Jacob, supra
at 234 n.30. See also Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners'
Rights, 53 IowA L. Ray. 671 (1967). There are few state court decisions upholding the
use of solitary (but see McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (App. Div.
1957)), but its universal prevalence indicates that the states consider it legally permissible.
RUBIN 293.
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the concept of solitary confinement.6 Those that have, usually on
grounds of cruel and unusual punishment,7 have discovered that bar-
barous conditions often accompany the use of solitary,8 and have based
6 See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Knuckles v. Prasse,
302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969);
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). These cases relied on the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. Solitary confinement, however,
has also been successfully attacked on other grounds. In United States ex rel. Cleggett v.
Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964), a prisoner was ordered out of solitary where
he had been confined during the pendency of his appeal. The court held that such con-
finement violated his fourteenth amendment right of access to the courts. See also Fuiwood
v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 377-79 (D.D.C. 1962). In Pierce v. LaValle, 293 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1961), solitary confinement for religious beliefs was found to be actionable under
the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)). In Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), the inmate was ordered released on equal protection grounds since there
was no factual support for the authorities' explanation of why she was isolated from
other prisoners. Due process may also be violated where no showing is made as to why
the prisoner is in solitary. Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Dabney v.
Cunningham, 317 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Va. 1970); see also Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428
(4th Cir. 1966). Absence of even rudimentary disciplinary procedures prior to use of
solitary also constitutes a due process violation. Carter v. McGinnis, 320 F. Supp. 1092
(W.D.N.Y. 1970); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Solitary has
also been found to be an improper punishment for unconvicted detainees. See Anderson
v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); contra, Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921 (D.
Colo. 1962). The latter case, however, was dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction and
was prior to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), which extended the eighth amend-
ment to the states. Thus Ruark is presumably no longer the law.
7 US. CONsTr. amend. VIII.
8 According to the allegations in Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967),
Lawrence Wright was confined in solitary for periods of 33 and 21 days. He charged
that the cell was filthy, without adequate heat, and virtually barren, containing only
a toilet and a sink, both of which were encrusted with slime, dirt, and human excrement.
He was naked for 11 days and subsequently was only provided underwear. He had no
soap, towel, toilet paper, toothbrush, or comb. Each day between 7:30 A.M. and 10:00
P.M., he said, he was required to stand at attention in front of his cell door whenever
a prison official appeared, and he therefore could not sleep during this period. When he
did sleep it was on a cold, rough concrete floor; moreover, he was confined in solitary
during the winter, and since the windows were kept open, he alleged that he often could
not sleep for fear he would freeze. His food was given to him without utensils in a bowl
on the floor. He was denied access to all literature. This punishment, if proved, the court
characterized as cruel and unusual. Id. at 520-22. The allegations were substantiated
on remand. Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
In Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), Don Lee Hancock alleged
that he was confined in a five-by-eight foot, dirty, unlighted cell with no furnishings except
a hole in the floor for a toilet. He was given no soap, towel, toilet paper, or other
hygienic aids and was fed one slice of bread for breakfast and for supper. He was given
a normal meal at noon, but it was in a paper container and he was forced to eat it
without utensils. He also claimed that he was forced to sleep nude and without covers
on the concrete floor of the cell. Id. at 789. The court stated that solitary confinement
was not per se objectionable, but when imposed in conjunction with such conditions
it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 792.
Finally, Robert Jordan was allegedly confined for 12 days in a strip cell measuring
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their decisions largely upon these conditions rather than upon the
effects of solitary generally. 9 But solitary confinement, with or without
egregious accompanying conditions, may itself be constitutionally
questionable.
I
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amend-
ment is both fluid and evolutionary, with contours difficult to define.'0
The courts have developed three interrelated tests to establish the
boundaries of cruel and unusual punishment; each attempts to resolve
the question of whether a "penalty subjects the individual to a fate
forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment.""l The first approach is to ask whether under
all the circumstances the punishment in question is "of such character
... as to shock general conscience or to be intolerable in fundamental
fairness,"'12 so that it does "more than offend some fastidious squeamish-
ness or private sentimentalism."' 1 Such a judgment must be made in
light of developing concepts of elemental decency that "mark the
progress of a maturing society."'14 Second, punishments may be cruel
and unusual when "by their excessive length or severity [they] are
six feet by eight feet four inches. There was neither light nor ventilation in the cell.
A hole in the floor served as a toilet and was flushed from the outside twice a day.
The cell was never cleaned and during Jordan's confinement it was covered with human
waste. He said that he had no means to clean his body or teeth, nor was he clothed
for eight days, although he was subsequently given a pair of overalls. He was not pro-
vided with eating utensils. His bed reportedly consisted of an old canvas mat on the
concrete floor; moreover, he could barely sleep for lack of heat in his cell. These condi-
tions were found to violate the eighth amendment. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674
(N.D. Cal. 1966). For description of conditions in other solitary confinement cases, see
Singer, Confining Solitary Confinement: Constitutional Arguments for a "New Penology,"
56 IowA L. Ray. 1251, 1254-58 (1971).
9 See Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In this case 400 days
segregated confinement was found to be constitutional, whereas 2V days confinement
under conditions similar to those in Wright, Jordan, and Hancock (note 8 supra) was
found to violate the eighth amendment. 302 F. Supp. at 1060-62.
30 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 288 (D. Alas. Terr. 1951).
'1 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
12 Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965), citing Carey v. Settle, 851 -F.2d
483 (8th Cir. 1965).
's Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); see also Wright v. McMann, 887
F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967).
14 Trop v. Dulles, 856 US. 86, 101 (1958).
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greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged."'15 Finally, a punish-
ment may be cruel and unusual, even though applied in pursuit of a
legitimate penal aim, if it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve
that aim-that is, if a punishment is unnecessary and excessive in view
of the purpose for which it is used.16
These three general tests17 can best be applied to solitary confine-
ment by separating its three distinct elements: (1) conditions accom-
panying confinement, (2) the length of confinement, and (3) the isola-
tion inherent in the confinement, irrespective of other conditions or
length.18
A. Conditions of Confinement
In Wright v. McMann,19 a prisoner in solitary confinement sought
injunctive relief. According to the complaint, his unheated cell had
only a toilet and sink as furnishings. During the winter, for periods
of thirty-three and twenty-one days he was confined in this cell with
no clothing but underwear (and not even that for the first eleven
days), given the most meager meals, and provided with no bed or soap.
The Second Circuit declared that these allegations, if proved, constitu-
ted an adequate showing of cruel and unusual punishment and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.2 0 The allegations were later
substantiated.21
The conditions alleged in Wright are not unique; they have been
15 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910), quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323, 339-40 (1891) (dissenting opinion). See also Watson v. United States, No. 21186
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 1968), quoted in S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRiM.AL LAw AND ITs
PRocss~s 160 (2d ed. 1969).
16 Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). For discussion
of the applicability of this approach to solitary confinement, see text accompanying
notes 44-64 infra.
17 Mr. Justice Fortas enunciated these three approaches in his dissent in Rudolf v.
Alabama, 375 US. 889, 890-91 (1963). For a further refinement, see Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
18 The courts have rarely used this particular framework. But see Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v. Oswald, 92 Sup. Ct. 719
(1972). Nevertheless, it is useful for purposes of analysis and because it facilitates the use
of terms common in psychological studies of punishment. See E. BoE & R. CHURcH,
PuNIsHMENT: IssuEs AND ExPRMEmNs 300 (1968); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law
in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473, 492 (1971).
Simply stated, "conditions" of confinement are the additional aspects of punishment other
than the confinement itself. Isolation is the essence of the punishment in solitary con-
'finement.
19 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
20 Id. at 527.
21 Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (ND.N.Y. 1970).
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found in other recent cases as well.2 2 But even if the conditions of
solitary were more humane, its duration might still make it a form
of unconstitutional punishment.
B. Duration
Duration of solitary confinement may in some cases be unlimited,23
provoking a harmful psychological reaction in the prisoner. The need
for specific limits on duration is supported by expert testimony of
psychologists. In deciding Wright on remand,24 the court relied heavily
on the testimony of Dr. Joseph Satten,25 a psychiatrist at the Menninger
Clinic.2 6 When asked what a prisoner's reaction would be to an in-
determinate sentence of solitary confinement imposed by a rather
arbitrary procedure, Dr. Satten said:
Generally, that tends to have a harmful effect on the prisoner,
in terms of increasing his resentment about the running of the
prison, his suspiciousness in relationship to correctional officers,
his rebelliousness towards society in general and his feeling that he
is being kicked around. In addition, that kind of anger can over-
develop into psychiatric associations to a paranoid suspicious
nature.27
A recent decision, Sostre v. Rockefeller,28 dealt with the duration
issue extensively, although it also considered other conditions accom-
panying solitary. Sostre attempted to set limits on the length of solitary
confinement, stating that "to be constitutional, punitive segregation as
22 E.g., Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See note 8 supra.
23 See H. BARNEs & N. TE.r.Rs, NEw HoRizoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY 351-52 (3d ed. 1959);
Teeters, supra note 3, at 5-6. See also Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036, 1061 (E.D.
Pa. 1969).
24 Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). Wright was awarded $1,500
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for the cruel and unusual punishment he suffered.
25 321 F. Supp. at 138. It should be noted that Dr. Satten did not completely rule
out the value of solitary as a disciplinary device. Record at 469-72.
26 Since there are few psychological studies on the effects of solitary confinement on
prison inmates (but see R. POOLEY, THE CONTROL or HuMAN BEHAvIOR IN A COaRCrTONAL
SErING (1970)), Dr. Satten's testimony is of some significance, particularly in light of his
long experience in prison psychology. Record at 413-17. See also Brief for Appellee at 42,
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub norn. Sostre v. Oswald, 92
Sup. Ct. 719 (1972).
27 Record at 433-84. Dr. Satten later gave two reasons for limiting lengthy solitary,
even in the absence of arbitrary prison procedures: (1) "individuals that don't respond
well to brief periods in punitive segregation usually have something wrong with them," and
(2) "a system of indefinite punitive segregation is very easily subject to abuses." Id. at 450.
See Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 142 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
28 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nor. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noma. Sostre v. Oswald; 92 Sup. Ct. 719 (1972). '
[Vol. 57: 476,
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practiced in Green Haven [prison] must be limited to no more than
fifteen days and may be imposed only for serious infractions of the
rules. " 29 The Second Circuit in a split decision reversed Sostre in
part.30 The majority recognized the adverse psychological effects of
prolonged solitary confinement, attested to by expert witnesses at the
original hearing,3 1 but held that solitary confinement was not uncon-
stitutional per se.82 The court stated that
[a]lthough the conditions Sostre endured were severe, we cannot
agree with the district court that they were "so foul, so inhuman,
29 Id. at 871. The American Correctional Association recommends ordinarily no more
than 15 days of solitary (AMRmCAN CORRECTIONAL AsSN, MANUAL OF ComREanONAL
STANDARDS 415 (3d ed. 1966)), as do the prison regulations of the District of Columbia
(see Fuwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 378 (D.D.C. 1962)). A S0-day limit in Ten-
nessee is mentioned in Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 788 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
However, the Fulwood case also demonstrated how prison officials can avoid such limits
by leaving the inmate in solitary for the maximum period, removing him for a short
period, and then putting him in again. 206 F. Supp. at 378-79. The Model Penal Code
states that "[fior serious or flagrant breach of the rules ... the offender [may] be confined
in a disciplinary cell for a period not to exceed thirty days." MODEL PENAL CODE §
304.7(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The recent case of Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.
Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970), recommends no more than 30 days. New Hampshire has a
statutory limit of 30 days (N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 622:14 (1955)) and Missouri limits
isolation on short food allowance to 10 days (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 216.455 (Supp. 1969)).
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 192-93 nn.19-21 (2d Cir. 1971). Until recently New
York had a statute which permitted indefinite confinement in solitary. N.Y. CoRec. LAw
§ 140 (McKinney 1968). It is now repealed. Id. §§ 138-40 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
Recent concern over prisoners' rights has prompted the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency to propose a Model Act which, among other things, would permit the
use of solitary only in emergency situations and never as a punishment. The act sets no
definite limit on the length of solitary confinement, but does provide limitations on its use.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRImE & DELINQUENCY, A MODEL Acr FOR THE PROTECTION OF RiGrrS
OF PRISONERS § 3 (1972).
30 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). Two judges concurred in Judge
Kaufman's majority opinion and two dissented. Two other judges, in a separate opinion,
would have affirmed the lower court on the cruel and unusual punishment finding. The
majority, however, reversed the lower court's findings of cruel and unusual punishment,
but on other grounds continued the injunction against further use of solitary confinement
against Sostre. Id. at 204. The majority affirmed the lower court's restoration of Sostre's
good-time credit (see note 47 infra) and indicated that some procedural limits on solitary
were necessary (see note 65 infra).
31 Mr. Rubin [former counsel for the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency] testified that Sostre's segregated environment was degrading, dehuman-
izing, conducive to mental derangement, and for these reasons "a gross departure"
from enlightened and progressive contemporary standards for the proper treat-
ment of prison inmates. Dr. Halleck [a psychiatrist from the University of Wis-
consin] feared that the isolation from human contact in punitive segregation
might cause prisoners to hallucinate and to distort reality. Long-term isolation
might have so serious an impact, in fact, as to "destroy" a person's "mentality."
442 F.2d at 190 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 192.
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and so violative of basic concepts of decency"... as to require that
similar punishments be limited in the future to any particular
length of time.33
The Sostre majority thus confused two aspects of solitary confine-
ment: accompanying conditions and duration. Assuming the conditions
were perfect, the punishment could still be so disproportionate in length
to the offense so as to place it within the eighth amendment's ban.
Judge Feinberg's dissent recognized this confusion:
The crucial holding of the majority opinion is the refusal to
put any limit upon the period of solitary confinement. It is the
unusual duration and the open-ended nature of the isolation that
the district court and the experts regarded as inflicting the worst
psychological harm. Accordingly, as we did in Wright v. Mc-
Mann.... I would hold that the punishment here, "which could
only serve to destroy completely the spirit and undermine the sanity
of the prisoner," runs afoul of the eighth amendment.34
C. Isolation
Psychological effects of punishment were recognized as a possible
element of an eighth amendment violation in Trop v. Dulles.3 5 The
Supreme Court stated that "punishment is offensive to cardinal prin-
ciples for which the Constitution stands" when it "subjects the individ-
ual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress."38 The Wright court
and the lower court and dissent in Sostre echoed this view. The Sostre
33 Id. at 191-92, quoting Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (footnote
omitted). In support of its conclusion that Sostre's solitary confinement was not cruel
and unusual punishment, the majority took a rather interesting position: before a court
declares a punishment unconstitutional under the eighth amendment, it should school
itself "[i]n such objective sources as historical usage, ... practices in other jurisdictions,
... and public opinion . I..." d. at 191. The majority found that solitary was permis-
sible based upon an analysis of these three sources.
Solitary does have a long history. See Ex parte Medley, 134 US. 160, 167-70 (1890).
It was repealed as a punishment in England, however, in the days of William IV. 6 & 7
Will. 4, c. 30 (1836). It is true that solitary is a common practice throughout the United
States, but the Sostre court seems to have neglected the fact-discussed in its own foot-
notes-that solitary is also often limited in duration. 442 F.2d at 192. See also note 29
supra.
34 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 209 (2d Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), quoting
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967). The majority felt that it was im-
possible to separate duration from conditions and thus could not set a definite length
of time beyond which solitary would be impermissible. 442 F.2d at 192-93. This refusal can
only lead to case by case, after the fact determinations.
35 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (loss of citizenship as punishment for desertion held to violate
eighth amendment). For a detailed analysis of mental suffering as possibility constituting
cruel and unusual punishment, see Singer, supra note 8, at 1272-76.
36 Id. at 102.
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lower court in particular would have based its finding of cruel and un-
usual punishment in part on the psychological effects of such confine-
ment on the prisoner:
This court finds that punitive segregation under the condi-
tions to which plaintiff was subjected at Green Haven is physically
harsh, destructive of morale, dehumanizing in the sense that it is
needlessly degrading, and dangerous to the maintenance of sanity
when continued for more than a short period of time.... 8
Although it is true that the accompanying conditions and excessive
duration of solitary often contribute to a prisoner's psychological in-
jury, when these factors are absent isolation alone can still have
damaging effects.38 The key focus of the lower court in Sostre was
neither the conditions nor duration of the punishment, but rather
the fear that human isolation 9 might endanger the prisoner's sanity.40
This fear is supported by Dr. Satten's testimony on remand in
Wright:
[S]egregation from peers or compatriots tends to encourage the
development of fantasy thinking and behavior in relationship
with people which dulls the capacity to relate adequately to other
people. And in a prolonged period or in an extreme form, upon
certain inmates, it can even reach the stage of mental illness.41
The American Correctional Association has pointed out that "[i]sola-
tion may bring short-term conformity for some, but brings increased
disturbances and deeper grained hostility to more." 42 And by Judge
Feinberg's evaluation,
37 Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub noma.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noma. Sostre v. Oswald, 92
Sup., Ct. 719 (1972). See Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Barnett
v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
aS See Record at 445, Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); see also
Singer, supra note 8, at 1264-72.
39 312 F. Supp. at 868. The Second Circuit accepted this analysis on review. 442 F.2d
at 185.
40 "Subjecting a prisoner to the demonstrated risk of the loss of his sanity as punish-
ment for any offense in prison is plainly cruel and unusual punishment as judged by
present standards of decency." 312 F. Supp. at 871. See also Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S.
160, 168 (1890).
41 Record at 426. Dr. Satten went on to describe this mental illness as
periods of withdrawal from reality usually accompanied by delusions and halluci-
nations in which the prisoner is at least for a while in a world of his own without
relationship to the world which is about him. Sometimes the medical word psy-
chosis or psychiatric break is used to describe these states.
Id. See also Brief for Appellee at 41, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
42 AmmucmA CoRaEcrioNAL Ass'N, supra note 29, at 413. The American Correctional
Association is a group of citizens, penologists, psychiatrists, and prison administrators
representing all the states and the federal government, that seeks "to encourage a more
1972]
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[i]n this Orwellian age, punishment that endangers sanity, no less
than physical injury by the strap, is prohibited by the Constitu-
tion. Indeed, we have learned to our sorrow in the last few decades
that true inhumanity seeks to destroy the pysche rather than
merely the body.4 3
II
PENOLOGICAL AIMS AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
It is clear, then, that in certain situations the conditions accom-
panying solitary confinement, its duration, and its inherent isolation
will render it unconstitutional. However, the courts must go beyond
a simple one-dimensional analysis of these factors in judging the con-
stitutionality of a punishment. That is, the courts should consider
solitary in relation to its success in achieving the penological aims in-
tended-rehabilitation, restraint, deterrence, and retribution.44 Thus
even when a punishment is not unconstitutional because of its accom-
panying conditions, duration, or isolation, it may be so because of its
lack of social or penal utility.45 The question, therefore, is whether
solitary confinement achieves the penological effects intended.
Solitary confinement is obviously retributive, but "[r]etribution
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation
and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of crim-
inal jurisprudence." 46 Moreover, a prisoner is already being punished
for his offenses against society;47 further punishment should not be
enlightened criminal justice in our society, [and] to promote improved practices in the
treatment of adult and juvenile offenders .... Id. at xix.
43 442 F.2d at 208 (dissenting opinion).
44 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963); Williams v. New York,
87 U.S. 241, 248 (1949); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111-12 (1958) (concurring opinion);
Rudolf v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
45 "The absence of an affirmative program of training and rehabilitation may have
constitutional significance where in the absence of such a program conditions and prac-
tices exist which actually militate against reform and rehabilitation." Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afJ'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). Cf. Rudolf v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890-91 (1963) (dissenting opinion). See also Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (concurring- opinion); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679
(N.D. Cal. 1966); Turner, supra note 18, at 501-03.
Interestingly, the majority in Sostre said that it did not question "the relevance to an
inquiry under the Eighth Amendment of. opinions which may represent a progressing
sense of humaneness as well as a new calculation as to the efficacy of penal practices."
442 F.2d at 191.
46 Williams v. New York, 537 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
47 "In a word, the sentence and all it implies is the punishment; the object of prison
treatment should not be to increase the punishment but to reform the prisoner." ScorrisH
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applied without some limitations.48 And even when the accompanying
conditions and duration of the confinement are limited, isolation's
psychological effects alone can be needlessly destructive.
Solitary does not serve the rehabilitative ideal, for the "use of
punitive segregation does not help the resocialization or rehabilitation
process but only makes it more difficult. '49 There seem to be two pos-
sible reasons for this difficulty. "[P]rolonged introspection, combined
with an almost total absence of fresh stimuli, does not regenerate. On
the contrary it demoralizes." 50 And "when the individual has displayed
an acute need for support, help and understanding, he is instead re-
moved from all human contact." 51
In addition, there is evidence that solitary produces little deterrent
effect. Approximately four of five prisoners who are confined in solitary
have received solitary or a similar punishment before. 2 It seems that
rather than deterring the prisoner, the additional punishment of soli-
tary may make him more likely to commit another breach of disci-
pline.53 In fact, some inmates may receive behavioral reinforcement
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION OF OFFENDERs, REPORT ON THE
SCOTTISH PRISON SysrE (1949), quoted in W. MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 260
(1968). Men, that is, "are sent to prison as a punishment and not for punishment." W.
MoBmY, supra at 260 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
An inmate's term in prison is usually lengthened by solitary confinement. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 4165 (1970). The inmate cannot gain good-time credits while in solitary,
and may even forfeit some or all of those already earned. Good-time is credited against
an inmate's total sentence; its purpose is to reward good behavior and thus to provide
an incentive for rehabilitation. It is common to reduce a sentence by seven to 10 days
for each month served without a record of misbehavior. Jacob, supra note 4, at 231.
Both the federal government and nearly every state have such statutes. RUBIN 807-14.
The lower court in Sostre, in finding the confinement there an illegal sentence,
held that some procedural safeguards were necessary before good-time credit was re-
voked. It restored 124 /s days of Sostre's good-time credit. 312 F. Supp. at 884. This
ruling was affirmed by the majority in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204 (2d Cir. 1971).
Some courts, however, hold that good-time is entirely a matter of grace (e.g., Graham
v. Thompson, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957)) and thus that its computation is purely an
administrative determination (e.g., People ex Yet. Gray v. Denno, 46 Misc. 2d 436, 259
N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Commonwealth v. Heston, 292 Pa. 501, 141 A. 287 (1928)).
Other courts have stated that they would intervene only when they believed that the
prison officials acted arbitrarily and capriciously. E.g., Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 380
(8th Cir. 1949). See Jacob, supra note 4, at 248-49.
48 Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
49 Record at 434, Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
50 W. MOBERLY, supra note 47, at 248-44.
51 Letter from Correctional Association of New York to New York State Assemblymen,
March 27, 1970, on file at the Cornell Law Review.
52 Fox, Prison Disciplinary Problems, in N. JOHNSTON, L. SAvrrz & M. WOLFGANc,
THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMZNT AND CoRREarON 898 (2d ed. 1970).
53 Id. at 898. See also R. PoorLE, supra note 26, at 19.
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in the form of recognition and praise from other inmates for being
able to "take" solitary. 4 Punishment as severe as solitary may also
fail to discourage offenses by other inmates.5
Solitary, of course, does prevent breaches of discipline by the
prisoner during the period of his confinement, but as a punishment
it is completely disproportionate to most prison offenses, which range
from assault 55 to dusty cell bars.57 Discipline must be rationally scaled
to the seriousness of the offense; solitary is too harsh a punishment for
dusty cell bars, but it may be the only way to restrain a truly dangerous
prisoner.
If the evil of the punishment exceed the evil of the offence,
the punishment will be unprofitable: the legislator will have
produced more suffering than he has prevented; he will have pur-
chased exemption from one evil at the expense of a greater.58
There are alternative disciplinary measures.59 The American Cor-
rectional Association recommends that solitary be used only "when
reprimands, loss of privileges, suspended sentences, and similar mea-
sures have been tried without satisfactory results and when the in-
fractions are not serious enough to warrant bringing the inmate to
trial in a criminal court." 60 Only through such limitations on the use
54 R. KORN & L. MCCORXLE, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 445 n.11 (1959). Pooley
also provides an interesting example. "The more frequently the subject was put into
solitary confinement, the more frequently he would receive admiration and respect from
his peers. Consequently, he would engage in disruptive behavior more frequently in order
to be put in solitary confinement." R. POOLEY, supra note 26, at 5-6.
55 In so far as the prevention of crime by others than the person dealt with is
concerned, psychologists agree and history demonstrates that neither fear of
monetary amercement nor the physical distress of imprisonment are of material
effect. What deterrence there may be springs from more subtle influences ....
If this be so, punishment, in the sense of treatment administered for the primary
purpose of causing suffering, is not necessary to attainment of the end sought.
J. wAITE, THE PREVENTION OF RE-EATED CRIME 87-88 (1943). See also W. MOBERLY, supra
note 47, at 260-61.
56 See Fox, supra note 52, at 396-97.
57 Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nom.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noma. Sostre v. Oswald,
92 Sup. Ct. 719 (1972). For a long list of trivial prison disciplinary offenses, see D. CLEMMER,
THE PRISON COMMUNITY 71 (1965); RuBIN 294 n.113.
58 J. BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WoRms or JEREMY BENrm 397
(J. Bowring ed. 1843).
59 For an innovative classification and punishment scheme using solitary confine-
ment only as a last resort with many procedural safeguards, see Morris v. Travisono, 310
F. Supp. 857, 865-75 (D.R.I. 1970).
60 AMERICAN CoRREcGioNAL Ass', supra note 29, at 418. The Association concludes
that to use solitary "as a standard disciplinary action for almost the entire range of
offenses is hardly a sensible solution to disciplinary problems." Id. at 412. See also PREsI-
DENT'S CoM'N ON LAw ENFORcEMENT AN ADMINISTRATION OF JusTnCE TASK Fom
RzPORT: ComcnoNs 50-51 (1967).
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of solitary can a penal system hope largely to avoid the physical and
psychological dangers"1 isolation poses for inmates.
Solitary confinement as practiced today has little or no social
utility. But courts, such as the majority in Sostre, refuse even to limit
its use, often retreating instead to the outdated doctrine of noninter-
ference with prison administrative processes. 62 What must be remem-
61 See, e.g., the discussion of such dangers in Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168
(1890); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1028 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rocke-
feller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nor. Sostre v. Oswald, 92 Sup. Ct. 719 (1972);
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See also New York City Bd.
of Correction, A Shuttle to Oblivion: A Report on the Life and Death of a Citizen,
Raymond Lavon, in the Manhattan House of Detention for Men, Also Known as "Tombs"
(Dec. 3, 1970). This report is an in-depth study of a prisoner from the time of his arrest
on a drug charge to the time of his suicide in solitary confinement.
62 Until recently federal courts refused to review cases that arose out of state prison
disciplinary proceedings on the grounds: (1) that the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment did not apply to the states; (2) that state remedies
should be utilized in the first instance; and (3) that courts should not interfere in the
internal discipline of prisons. See Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1967).
Any uncertainty as to the applicability of the eighth amendment to the states was re-
moved by Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), the Supreme Court held that exhaustion of state remedies was not a prerequisite
to acceptance of jurisdiction by a federal court. However, although the federal courts
have accepted some state prisoners' suits, they are still reluctant to interfere in the
internal discipline of prisons except in extreme cases. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J.
506 (1963). As for the necessary showing required to overcome the noninterference doc-
trine, the federal courts of appeal have phrased the test in many different ways. See, e.g.,
Ford v. Board of Managers, 407 F.2d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 1969) ("barbaric conditions');
Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1968) ("unlawful and onerous treatment");
Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (10th Cir. 1967) ("clear arbitrariness or caprice
upon the part of prison officials'); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1965) ("ex-
treme cases" of censorship or restriction of correspondence), Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483,
485 (8th Cir. 1965) ("intolerable" discipline); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 550 (4th
Cir. 1963) ("vindictive, cruel or inhuman" treatment); see also White v. Clemmer, 295
F.2d 132, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ("dear cases of illegality of action').
Confusion on when to intervene is basically owing to the difficulty of distinguishing
between reasonable prison discipline and cruel and unusual or otherwise illegal punish-
ment. The results have been seemingly inconsistent decisions. One court has declared un-
constitutional a period in solitary of 2V2 days. Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036, 1062
(E.D. Pa. 1969). Another court has upheld a period of more than two years. Graham v.
Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967). Some prisoners have been unable to obtain
relief, no matter how trivial the reasons for confinement and no matter how barbaric the
confinement. See Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), where the court held
that the use of tear gas 12 to 15 times a year in an isolation wing of a Virginia prison
was a legitimate disciplinary measure and not cruel and unusual punishment. Nor was
it cruel and unusual to put the prisoner in prolonged solitary confinement for infrac-
tions such as using legal papers supplied by the prison as scrap paper. Id. Recently,
however, the Supreme Court reversed an Illinois case (Haines v. Kerner, 427 F.2d 71
(7th Cir. 1970)) -which had dismissed an inmate's pro se complaint alleging that 15 days
solitary confinement was cruel and unusual punishment and deprivation of due process.
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bered is that prisoners have rights too,63 which must be balanced
against the legitimate interests of the state. Upon remand, the court
in Wright v. McMann, in finding Wright's solitary confinement to
violate the eighth amendment, stated,
The consequences of abrupt and arrogant interference had to be
weighed and balanced with the compelling interest to uphold
federal constitutional rights in accord with modern precepts. The
balance must be kept true as Justice Cardozo said, and there must
be equal understanding of the prison administration problems as
well as those of the inmates.04
CONCLUSION
To be constitutional, solitary confinement must be severely limited
in its use, for it actually serves legitimate penal aims only in very
limited circumstances. Even in such circumstances, however, isolation
will take its psychological toll. Specific restrictions on duration and
accompanying conditions must be set so that the use of solitary may
become at once less frequent and more humane. Confinement exceed-
ing these limits should be subject to judicial remedy.65 The problem
of isolation would thus continue, but on a greatly reduced scale. In
addition, if procedural safeguards were available 6  to limit the use of
The lower courts had based their dismissal on the noninterference doctrine and a finding
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court, holding that
there was error in dismissing the complaint without allowing the inmate to present evi-
dence, reversed and remanded the case for an opportunity to offer proof. Haines v.
Kerner, 92 Sup. Ct. 453 (1972) (per curiam). See also I-irschkop & Millemann, The Un-
constitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. Rav. 795 (1969).
63 Although historically prisoners were considered slaves of the state (Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1891)), the Supreme Court acknowledged in 1894
that they had some rights. In re Bonner, 151 U.. 242 (1894). It is now recognized that a
"prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or lby neces-
sary implication, taken from him by law." Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945). The due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment have been held to follow convicts into prison. Talley v.
Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965). See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 US. 483,
486 (1969); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529,
532 (5th Cir. 1968).
64 321 F. Supp. 127, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
65 See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, A MODEL ACr FOR THE PROTECTION
OF RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 6 (1972).
66 The lower court in Sostre also held that any solitary confinement would be un-
constitutional without:
1) written notice [to the prisoner] of the charges against him (in advance of a
hearing) which designated the prison rule violated; 2) a hearing before an
impartial official at which he had the right to cross-examine his accusers and call
witnesses in rebuttal; 8) a written record of the hearing, decision, reasons there-
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solitary to only the most severe breaches of institutional regulations,67
its proper role within the context of reasonable prison discipline might
be determined, and possibly its social utility correspondingly increased.
Kenneth M. Cole III
for and evidence relied upon; and 4) [opportunity to] retain counsel or a counsel
substitute.
Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nom. Sostre
v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v. Oswald, 92 Sup.
Ct. 719 (1972). The Second Circuit reversed this part of the holding, but it did indicate that
some procedural safeguards were necessary; the prisoner, for example, should be con-
fronted with the accusation, informed of the evidence, and afforded a reasonable op-
portunity to explain his actions. 442 F.2d at 198. See also Clutchette v. Procunier, 328
F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (hearing rights similar to those granted in Sostre afforded
to prisoners facing possible solitary confinement or postponement of parole); Carter v.
McGinnis, 320 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (W.D.N.Y. 1970); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp.
1014, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Model Act suggests a procedure in which counsel is pres-
ent and a pernanent record kept for all cases affecting sentence or parole eligibilty.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, A MODEL Acr FOR THE PROTECTION OF
RcrHTs Or PRISONERS § 4 (1972). It should be noted, however, that attacking the absence of
procedural due process in prison discipline may be a tactical mistake. By granting some
procedural rights to prisoners, the courts are able to avoid reaching the issue of the
consitutionality of solitary confinement itself.
67 [Solitary] is a major disciplinary measure, which can have damaging effect
upon some inmates, and should be used judiciously when other forms of action
prove inadequate or where the safety of others or the serious nature of the
offense makes it necessary.
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, supra note 29, at 413.
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